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Abstract
The EU is bound by human rights obligations toward individuals outside the territory of its Member
States who are affected by its trade and investment policies. Internal rules of the EU, namely
the Founding Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and various external norms, that is
international law sources, impose human rights obligations on the EU. Those human rights obligations
are increasingly interpreted by treaty monitoring bodies as requiring extraterritorial due diligence duties
from States parties, in the sense that the creation of substantial and foreseeable effects outside the State’s
territory establishes the jurisdiction of the State party. This jurisdiction leads to positive obligations,
namely the duty to exert due diligence on trade and investment policies. The EU is expected to assess the
risks of human rights violations by its trade and investment partners in and outside its Member States and
take all reasonable efforts to avoid foreseeable human rights violations. Although those human rights
are likely to continue to be unenforceable before the Court of Justice, the consistent reference to due
diligence obligations by treaty monitoring bodies, the European Ombudsman and the European Data
Protection Supervisor should encourage EU institutions to comply with their due diligence obligations.
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1. Introduction
It is generally accepted in the case law, and arguably under customary international law, that international
human rights conventions protect individuals when the State party performs its conduct outside its
territory.1 However, it is much more uncertain whether international human rights law protects individuals
abroad from the extraterritorial effects of the domestic policies of States, and a fortiori international
organisations (IOs). Since 2014, fruitful debates have contributed to the theoretical framework of the
human rights obligations of the European Union (EU) in its external policies.2 The opposing arguments
for and against its binding so-called extraterritorial obligations focus on the scope of the human rights
obligations of the EU, namely whether they impose a merely negative conduct to respect the human
rights of persons affected by the policies of the EU outside its territory or indeed positive obligations
to protect and that should be fulfiled.3 The scholarly debate also addresses the enforceability of those
human rights obligations by persons affected by the policies of the EU outside its territory. However, as
at summer 2018, few authors have focused on specific policies of the EU’s external action such as trade
and investment treaties,4 which, because of the wide range of the EU’s partner States, might affect most
individuals outside of the EU’s territory.
Moreover, several recent legal developments might now contribute to the debate. The first significant
development is the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding trade in
products from Western Sahara, occupied by Morocco. The EU and Morocco successively concluded an
association agreement in 1996, a partnership agreement in the fisheries sector (‘Fisheries Agreement’)
in 2006 and a liberalisation agreement with respect to agricultural and fisheries products in 2012
(‘Liberalisation Agreement’). The Front Polisario, a national liberation movement representing the
Sahrawi people, brought an action before the General Court seeking the annulment of the decision on the
Liberalisation Agreement, claiming among other reasons that applying the Liberalisation Agreement to
Western Sahara would violate EU law and international law. By the first Polisario judgment, delivered
on 10 December 2015, the General Court annulled the decision, finding, first, that the Liberalisation
Agreement was applicable ‘to the territory of the Kingdom of Morocco’.5 The General Court held that
the Council had failed to fulfil its obligation to examine, before the conclusion of the Liberalisation
Agreement, whether there was any evidence of the exploitation of the natural resources of Western Sahara
under Moroccan control likely to be to the detriment of its inhabitants and to infringe their fundamental
rights. After the Council brought an action before the CJEU seeking the annulment of this judgment, on
21 December 2016 the CJEU concluded that the Liberalisation Agreement does not apply to the territory
of Western Sahara and set aside the judgment of the General Court.6 The Court based its conclusion
mainly on the rules of international law applicable to relations between the EU and Morocco, as required
by the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. In line with this second Polisario judgment, the
1Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory [2004] ICJ Rep 180, para 112 (Wall
Advisory Opinion); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) [2005] ICJ
Rep 243–4, para 217; Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Georgia v Russian Federation) (Provisional Measures) [2008] ICJ Rep 386, para 109.
2Lorand Bartels, ‘The EU’s Human Rights Obligations in Relation to Policies with Extraterritorial Effects’ (2014) 25
European Journal of International Law 1071; Enzo Cannizzaro, ‘The EU’s Human Rights Obligations in Relation to Policies with
Extraterritorial Effects: A Reply to Lorand Bartels’ (2014) 25 European Journal of International Law 1093; Violeta Moreno-Lax
and Cathryn Costello, ‘The Extraterritorial Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: From Territoriality to Facticity,
the Effectiveness Model’ in Steve Peers and others (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (1st edn,
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG 2014); Cristophe Maubernard, ‘Prendre La Promotion Externe Des Droits de l’homme
Par l’Union Européenne’ in Romain Tinière and Claire Vial (eds), Protection des droits fondamentaux dans l’Union européenne
(Bruylant 2015); Aravind Ganesh, ‘The European Union’s Human Rights Obligations Towards Distant Strangers’ (2015) 37
Michigan Journal of International Law 475.
3For the former view: Bartels (n 2) 1075; for the latter: Ganesh (n 2) 479; Cannizzaro (n 2) 1097–8.
4Samantha Velluti, ‘The Promotion and Integration of Human Rights in EU External Trade Relations’ (2016) 32 Utrecht
Journal of International and European Law 41.
5Case T-512/12 Front populaire pour la libération de la saguia-el-hamra et du rio de oro (Front Polisario) v Council of the
European Union [2015] ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, para 103 (Front Polisario v Council, General Court judgment).
6Case C-104/16 P Council of the European Union v Front populaire pour la libération de la saguia-el-hamra et du rio de oro
(Front Polisario) [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:973 (Polisario case, judgment of the Court of Justice).
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CJEU later confirmed in a preliminary ruling that neither the Fisheries Agreement nor the Protocol thereto
are applicable to the waters adjacent to the territory of Western Sahara, and consequently the EU acts
relating to their conclusion and implementation are valid.7 What this case law shows is the importance of
the protection of human rights in the external action of the EU.
Furthermore, beyond the case law of the CJEU, some other control mechanisms, such as the European
Ombudsman and the European Data Protection Supervisor, reviewed the EU’s compliance with human
rights in its external trade actions. Those control mechanisms addressed non-binding recommendations to
the EU institutions as to the protection of human rights against extraterritorial effects of EU policies and
might have influenced certain procedures of the CJEU.8
The present paper examines the EU’s human rights obligations in the context of its external trade and
investment policies and submits that while the dominant case law and the primary law of the EU impose an
enforceable obligation to respect the human rights of persons affected by the Common Commercial Policy,
a dynamic view addressing due diligence obligations is recommended by human rights bodies inside and
outside the institutional structure of the EU. Under this due diligence standard, the EU is expected to
carry out a human rights impact assessment before engaging in any international trade policy to ensure
that the envisaged policy measure complies with existing human rights obligations and standards and will
have no adverse effects on human rights of individuals outside the EU. The paper answers two particular
questions: (1) what are the legal foundations, and (2) is the duty to protect extraterritorially enforceable?
The paper thus focuses on regulation or conduct of the EU at the international level, which is
considered as, strictly speaking, extraterritorial conduct or the Union’s external action,9 but it does not
examine in details domestic regulation or conduct of the EU that produces detrimental effects from the
perspective of human rights outside EU’s order and territory (domestic conduct having extraterritorial effects).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 examines the legal foundations of the EU’s duty to protect
extraterritorially, namely, the EU law foundations first (2.1), and the international law foundations second
(2.2). Subsection 2.2 will illustrate that sources extraneous to the EU rules stemming from international
law confirm the positive obligations of the EU to protect the human rights of individuals outside the
EU affected by its trade policy. The same subsection discusses among the international law sources a
substantial law obligation, the so-called due diligence standard. Section 3 explains that the same due
diligence-focused interpretation might shape the enforcement of the human rights obligations of the EU.
The conclusions clarify that the EU’s extraterritorial human rights obligations include procedural duties
both as to the negotiation phase of international trade agreement and in respect of their implementation.
2. The legal foundations of the duty to protect extraterritorially
2.1. EU law foundations
Among the primary rules (the founding treaties and their amendments) addressing or giving guidance on
the EU’s human rights obligations, the following main sources protect human rights: Articles 3(5), 6 and
21 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union (EUCFR). The EUCFR was attached to the TEU by the Treaty of Lisbon and has the same legal
value as the treaties.10
Article 3(5) TEU states the aims of the EU ‘[i]n its relations with the wider world’ to be, namely, the
obligations to ‘uphold and promote its values and interests’ and to ‘contribute’ to certain norms such as
‘fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights’. Consequently, when the EU adopts
an act, ‘it is bound to observe international law in its entirety, including customary international law’11 and
7Case C-266/16 The Queen, on the application of Western Sahara Campaign UK v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue
and Customs and Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:118 (Western Sahara
Campaign UK).
8See in particular Opinion 1/15 [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:592 below, in subsection 3.1.
9Part V of the Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/47 (TFEU)
and other external aspects of domestic policies, eg those of the common agricultural policy, such as the conclusion of fishing
agreements with third States under art 43 TFEU.
10TEU, art 6(1).
11Case C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America and Others [2011] ECR 2011-00000, para 101; Case C-507/13
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its international human rights obligations.12 Article 21(1) TEU is the other important provision concerning
the EU’s human rights obligations. It provides that the EU ‘shall be guided by’ similar principles in
its external action, including by ‘the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental
freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles
of the United Nations Charter and international law’. Among the objectives of its external action, Article
21(2)(b) provides that the EU shall ‘consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights
and the principles of international law’. These principles and objectives equally apply to the Common
Commercial Policy.13
Furthermore, Article 21(3)(1) TEU provides:
The Union shall respect the principles and pursue the objectives set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 in the
development and implementation of the different areas of the Union’s external action covered by this
Title and by Part Five of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and of the external
aspects of its other policies.14
This last provision is arguably wider than the others because it binds the EU not only in its external
action, but also in all ‘the external aspects of its other policies’, including its internal policies having
extraterritorial effects.15 Furthermore, respecting the aforementioned principles (‘the universality and
indivisibility of human rights’) necessarily implies the duty to respect human rights.16
As the Court recognised in the European Parliament v. Council of the European Union case,
compliance [with the principles of the rule of law, human rights and human dignity] is required of all
actions of the European Union, including those in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP), as is clear from the provisions, read together, set out in the first subparagraph of Article 21(1),
Article 21(2)(b) and (3) TEU, and Article 23 TEU.17
Even though these treaty provisions use wordings that express positive obligations, such as ‘promote’,
‘contribute’, ‘consolidate and support’, some authors argue that they do not require the EU to act in a
particular way to protect or fulfil the human rights of individuals outside the EU.18 Nevertheless, as
the recent case law of the CJEU shows (below), it is more plausible to interpret those treaty Articles as
imposing positive obligations.
Finally, Article 6(1) TEU provides that ‘[t]he Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles
set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’,19 while Article 6(3) considers
fundamental rights ‘as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms [ECHR]’ and ‘as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the
Member States’, as ‘general principles of the Union’s law’.20 These provisions bind all EU institutions in
all their policies as common provisions and do not contain any territorial limitation. Similarly, the EUCFR
defines its scope ratione materiae without defining any scope ratione loci. Its Article 51(1) provides
that the provisions of the Charter ‘are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the
Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are
implementing Union law’, ‘in accordance with their respective powers and respecting the limits of the
powers of the Union as conferred on it in the Treaties’.21 Unlike several other international human rights
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union [2014] ECR
2011-00000, Opinion of AG Jääskinen, para 41.
12See below, in subsection 2.2.3.
13TFEU, arts 205 and 207; Opinion 2/15 of the Court (Full Court) [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:376, para 145.
14TEU, art 21(3)(1).
15Bartels (n 2) 1074.
16ibid.
17Case C-263/14 European Parliament v Council of the European Union [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:435, para 47; confirmed in:
Opinion of AG Case C-104/16 P Council of the European Union v Front Populaire pour la libération de la saguia-el-hamra et
du rio de oro (Front Polisario) [2016] (Opinion of AG Wathelet), para 255 (Opinion of AG Wathelet, Polisario case).
18Bartels (n 2) 1075; a contrario, with regard to international environmental law: Nelson F Coelho, ‘Extraterritoriality from
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treaties, which limit their territorial scope to the ‘jurisdiction’ of the State party, the EUCFR does not
have such a provision. Indeed, it implies the general understanding that EU institutions are bound by its
provisions while ‘implementing Union law’, whether it takes place within the territory of the Member
States or outside the EU.22 From EU instruments, it is clear that whenever EU institutions act outside the
territory of the EU, they are bound by the Charter.23 However, it is doubtful whether the Charter requires
the EU to respect and protect the fundamental rights of individuals affected by extraterritorial effects of
EU policies. Most provisions of the EUCFR do not distinguish between EU citizens and non-citizens,
except the right to work and the citizens’ rights enshrined in Title V,24 and some provisions are expressly
addressed to non-EU citizens.25
Some CJEU precedents confirm the view that the EUCFR is applicable to protect individuals against
extraterritorial effects of EU policies. In the Mugraby case, the Court did not question the applicant’s
assumption that damages can be claimed from the EU in respect of injuries that occurred as a result of the
failure of the EU to adopt measures against the Republic of Lebanon on the basis of a human rights clause
in the Association Agreement between the Community and the Republic of Lebanon.26 In the Petruhhin
and Schotthöfer cases, the Court held more explicitly that the Charter is applicable where a Member State
intends to extradite an EU national at the request of a third State, and the Member State shall verify that
the extradition will not prejudice the rights referred to in Article 19 of the EUCFR.27 In various cases, the
Court held that Articles 4 and 19(2) EUCFR require any Member State to assess in removal, expulsion
or extradition proceedings whether there exist substantial grounds for believing that the third country
national would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment if sent back to the
country of origin.28 This case law follows also from the absolute nature of the prohibition of inhuman
or degrading treatment,29 and the rule of harmonious interpretation with the case law of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) under Article 52(3) EUCFR,30 and, in particular, the rich case law
of the European Court of Human Rights applying Article 3 ECHR.31 Similarly, agents of the European
Border Guard and Coast Guard ‘shall ensure that no person is disembarked in, forced to enter, conducted
to, or otherwise handed over or returned to, the authorities of a country in contravention of the principle
of non-refoulement’.32 In all of the above-mentioned cases, the risk assessment prevents human rights
violations likely to occur in a third State as a consequence of the internal decision of a Member State.
In the Polisario judgment of December 2015, annulled by the Grand Chamber of the Court of
Justice, the General Court held that before any export facilitation agreement, ‘the Council must examine,
carefully and impartially, all the relevant facts in order to ensure that the production of goods for export is
not conducted to the detriment of the population of the territory concerned, or entails infringements of
fundamental rights’.33 On appeal, the Advocate General seemed to accept the obligation of the EU to
22Opinion of AG Wathelet, Polisario case (n 17) para 270; Moreno-Lax and Costello (n 2) 1662, 1679, 1682.
23eg Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 on the European Border and Coast Guard [2016] OJ L 251/1, arts 36(7) and 54(1)–(3) and
art 34(1).
24EUCFR, arts 15(2) and 39–46.
25ibid, arts 15(3), 18, 45(2).
26Case T-292/09 Muhamad Mugraby v Council of the European Union [2011] 2011 II-00255, Order approved in appeal: Case
C-581/11 P Muhamad Mugraby v Council of the European Union [2012] 2012-00000.
27Case C-182/15 Aleksei Petruhhin [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:630, paras 52–3; Case C-473/15 Peter Schotthöfer & Florian
Steiner GbR [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:633, paras 23–4.
28eg Case C-394/12 Shamso Abdullahi v Bundesasylamt [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:813, paras 60, 62; Case C-562/13 Centre
public d’action sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve v Moussa Abdida [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2453, paras 46-53; Case
C-353/16 MP v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:276, paras 43-44.
29Case C-578/16 PPU C. K., H. F., A. S. v Republika Slovenija [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:127, para 69.
30Case C-239/14 Abdoulaye Amadou Tall v Centre public d’action sociale de Huy [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:824, para 54;
C. K., H. F., A. S. v Republika Slovenija (n 29) para 67.
31ECtHR, Gebremedhin v France (2010) 50 EHRR 29, para 67; Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy (2012) 55 EHRR 21, para 200.
32Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 (n 23), art 43(2).
33Front Polisario v Council, General Court judgment (n 5) para 228; on the doctrinal comments, see: Álvaro de Elera, ‘The
Frente Polisario Judgments: An Assessment in the Light of the Court of Justice’s Case Law on Territorial Disputes’ in Jeno˝
Czuczai and Frederik Naert, The EU as a Global Actor – Bridging Legal Theory and Practice: Liber Amicorum in honour
of Ricardo Gosalbo Bono (BRILL 2017); Sandra Hummelbrunner and Anne-Carlijn Prickartz, ‘It’s Not the Fish That Stinks!
EU Trade Relations with Morocco under the Scrutiny of the General Court of the European Union’ 32 Utrecht Journal of
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resort to a prior human rights impact assessment under the said conclusion, but excluded the applicability
of the EUCFR to extraterritorial effects.34 His reasoning was inspired from the case law of othe European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the ‘jurisdiction clause’ of the ECHR. He claimed that the Charter
does apply extraterritorially ‘where an activity is governed by EU law and carried out under the effective
control of the EU and/or its Member States but outside their territory’, but could not apply in the case
under consideration to Western Sahara ‘since in this case neither the European Union nor its Member
States exercise control over Western Sahara and Western Sahara is not among the territories to which EU
law is applicable’.35 He seemed to apply, without any reason, the territorial limitation of the ‘jurisdiction
clause’ of the ECHR to the Charter and the spatial type of extraterritorial ‘effective control’ over an
area developed in the case law of the ECtHR,36 disregarding the scope of application of the EUCFR
as defined exclusively ratione materiae. However, the Court of Justice did not specifically address this
point in its judgment and annulled the judgment for other reasons, namely on the basis of the territorial
non-applicability of the Liberalisation Agreement to the territory of Western Sahara.37
These few precedents do not establish a coherent case law confirming the application of the EUCHR
to protect individuals against extraterritorial effects of EU policies. However, they indicate the possibility
of the CJEU continuing to follow such a broad interpretation in the future. As the next subsection (2.2) will
show, the international law norms binding the EU provide additional legal basis for the EU’s obligations
to protect human rights against extraterritorial effects of its policies.
2.2. International law foundations
Among the international law sources that impose human rights obligations on the EU are customary
international law (2.2.1), human rights clauses of bilateral treaties concluded with third States (2.2.2),
and multilateral human rights conventions to which the EU is or intends to be party (2.2.3). As a further
foundation, the paper examines a substantial obligation, namely the so-called due diligence standard
in trade and investment policies (2.2.4), which originates both from customary international law and
treaty obligations.
2.2.1. Customary international law
As derived subjects of international law, IOs are automatically bound by the rules of general international
law,38 including customary international law. A customary international law norm binds any IO as far as
its content is applicable to the functional legal personality of that IO.39
Various customary international law rules40 are binding on the EU41 and apply to EU policies that
have extraterritorial effects. The customary rules relevant to this paper are the due diligence standard;
International and European Law 19; Denys Simon and Anne Rigaux, ‘Le Tribunal et Le Droit International Des Traités: Un
Arre˛t Déconcertant. . . – (Trib. UE, 10 December 2015, Aff. T-512/12, Front Polisario c/Conseil Soutenu Par Commission)’
(2016) 26 Europe 5.
34Opinion of AG Wathelet, Polisario case (n 17) paras. 262, 268–9.
35ibid, paras 270–1.
36Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections) (1995) 20 EHRR 99; Al-Skeini and Others v The United Kingdom (2011) 53
EHRR 18; Al-Jedda v The United Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR 23.
37Polisario case, judgment of the Court of Justice (n 6); on the doctrinal comments, see: Alan Hervé, ‘La Cour de Justice de
l’Union Européenne Comme Juge de Droit Commun Du Droit International Public?’ (2017) 53 Revue trimestrielle de droit
europeen 23; Jed Odermatt, ‘Council of the European Union v Front Populaire Pour La Libération de La Saguia-El-Hamra et Du
Rio de Oro (Front Polisario)’ (2017) 111 American Journal of International Law 731; de Elera (n 33).
38Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt (Advisory Opinion) [1980] ICJ Rep 89–90,
para 37.
39Gérard Cahin, La coutume internationale et les organisations internationales: l’incidence de la dimension institutionnelle
sur le processus coutumier (Pedone 2001) 520–7; Mathias Forteau, ‘Organisations internationales et sources du droit’ in Évelyne
Lagrange and Jean-Marc Sorel (eds), Droit des organisations internationales (LGDJ-Lextenso éditions 2013) 272.
40Customary international law is one of the main sources of international law, defined by the Statute of the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) ‘as evidence of a general practice accepted as law’. See ICJ Statute, art 38(1)(b).
41Case C-286/90 Anklagemyndigheden v Peter Michael Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corp [1992] ECR 1992 I-06019, paras
9–10; Case T-115/94 Opel Austria GmbH v Council of the European Union [1997] ECR 1998 II-02739, paras 84, 90; Case
C-162/96 A. Racke GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Mainz [1998] ECR 1998 I-03655, paras 45–6; Air Transport Association of
America and Others (n 11) paras 101, 123; Western Sahara Campaign UK (n 7) para 47.
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the obligation to cooperate to bring a breach of a jus cogens norm to an end; and the obligation not to
recognise the situation created by such a breach or to render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.
First of all, customary international law requires States to comply with the so-called due diligence
standard under which ‘no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as
to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein’.42 Certain
human rights experts interpret this customary norm as requiring the State ‘to respect and protect human
rights extraterritorially’,43 while the customary norm does not a priori create in itself a human right of
the injured persons.44 An exception can be foreseen when the responsible State owes already the injured
State a pre-existing obligation to respect the human rights of its citizens,45 for example under a human
rights clause forming part of a bilateral trade treaty concluded between the EU and the third State.
Customary international law also obliges States and international organisations to cooperate
internationally to bring to an end the jus cogens violations,46 understood as breaches of peremptory
norms.47 In its case law on the review of the lawfulness of EU measures implementing UN Security
Council resolutions, the CJEU itself recognised ‘the standard of universal protection of the fundamental
rights of the human person covered by jus cogens’.48 Such peremptory norms include, for example,
the right to self-determination, the prohibitions against genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
slavery, racial discrimination, extra-judicial executions, enforced disappearances, and torture, and other
cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment.49 Thus, the duty to cooperate internationally to
bring to an end those violations of peremptory norms requires the active cooperation of the EU, through
its external action such as trade or development policies to eliminate for example slavery, torture or
trafficking of human beings.50 The duty to cooperate includes the obligation to collaborate in investigating
those international crimes and prosecuting the perpetrators. This is a so-called due diligence duty, as
explained by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the case of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Serbia and Montenegro).51 Indeed, the ICJ recognised the applicability of the same customary norms to
IOs when it held in the Wall Advisory Opinion:
The United Nations, and especially the General Assembly and the Security Council, should consider
what further action is required to bring to an end the illegal situation resulting from the construction
of the wall and the associated regime, taking due account of the present Advisory Opinion.52
42Trail smelter case (United States, Canada) (1938, 1941) III UNRIAA 1905, 1965; in the same sense: Corfu Channel Case
(UK v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 22, para 3 (‘every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for
acts contrary to the rights of other States’).
43Extra territorial obligations (ETOs) for Human Rights Beyond Borders, Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations
of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Heidelberg, 2013), Principle 3, <https://www.etoconsortium.org/
nc/en/main-navigation/library/maastricht-principles/?tx_drblob_pi1%5BdownloadUid%5D=23> accessed 15 September 2016
(Maastricht Principles); Olivier De Schutter and others, ‘Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations
of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2012) 34 Human Rights Quarterly 1084, 1095–6 (Commentary
to Principle 3).
44Bartels (n 2) 1082.
45ibid.
46ILC, Draft articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts [2001] II (Part 2) YbILC 26 (ARSIWA),
113–4, art 41(1); Draft articles on the responsibility of international organisations [2011] II (Part 2) YbILC 2 (DARIO), 66–8,
art 42(1).
47A norm of jus cogens is defined as ‘a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as
a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international
law having the same character.’ Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 23 May 1969, art 53.
48Case T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council and Commission [2005] ECR 2005 II-03649, para 226; Case T-306/01
Ahmed Ali Yusuf v Council and Commission [2005] ECR 2005 II-03533, para 286; unlike the Court of First Instance, the Grand
Chamber of the CJEU did not however make reference to jus cogens or customary law in its appeal decision. Joined Cases
C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P European Commission and Others v Yassin Abdullah Kadi [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:518.
49De Schutter and others (n 43) 1096.
50Eg in cases involving trafficking of human beings: Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia (2010) 51 EHRR 1, para 289; M. and
Others v Italy and Bulgaria App no 40020/03 (ECtHR, 31 July 2012) para 167; L.E. v Greece App no 71545/12 (ECHR,
21 January 2016) para 85; J. and Others v Austria App no 58216/12 (ECHR, 17 January 2017) para 105.
51Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v
Serbia and Montenegro) [2007] ICJ Rep 43, para 430.
52Wall Advisory Opinion (n 1), 200, para 160.
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Furthermore, no State or international organisation shall recognise as lawful a situation created by a
breach of a peremptory norm, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.53 For the same
reason, in order to avoid a trade treaty that could contribute to the maintenance of a serious breach, the
Advocate General proposed that ‘before concluding international agreements, the EU institutions must
ensure compliance with the very short list of peremptory norms of international law’.54 Indeed, some
authors are of the view that an EU trade agreement with respect to products originating from an occupied
territory might breach the customary duty of non-recognition of violations of peremptory norms unless
the EU ensures that these goods benefit the local population.55
2.2.2. Human rights clauses of bilateral treaties
Bilateral and multilateral conventions concluded by the EU, once they enter into force, impose international
obligations on the Union and form an integral part of the EU legal order.56 The EU has concluded many
bilateral partnership and trade agreements with third States. Since the 1990s it consistently inserts
so-called human rights clauses in its framework agreements, which provide that the Parties respect human
rights and are considered as an essential element clause. Most human rights clauses follow a standard
formula, such as in the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine:
Respect for democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as defined in particular
in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the
Charter of Paris for a New Europe of 1990, and other relevant human rights instruments, among them
the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, and respect for the principle of the rule of law shall form the basis of the
domestic and external policies of the Parties and constitute essential elements of this Agreement.57
An important feature of such human rights clauses is that they include reference to basic human
rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, considered as enshrining customary
international law, or to human rights conventions to which the third State is already party to or to ‘other
relevant human rights instruments’. The latter formula leaves ‘an open-ended possibility for future
inclusion of international human rights instruments’,58 especially those conventions that are generally
accepted to apply extraterritorially and to extraterritorial effects of domestic State policies such as the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (see 2.2.3).
Furthermore, the human rights clauses are usually supported by a non-execution clause, which
enables each of the Parties to adopt ‘appropriate measures’ in case of non-fulfilment of the obligations,
including the human rights clause.59 A human rights clause prohibits, for example, involvement in
human rights violations in other countries; the EU could accordingly take appropriate measures under the
Cotonou Agreement against Liberia as a result of that country’s assistance to the Front uni révolutionnaire
in Sierra Leone.60 The decision on taking such appropriate measures under the non-execution clause
falls within the discretion of the given Party;61 in practice, such decisions have been rarely taken,62 and
always as a reaction to violations of the human rights clause by the third State. However, the majority of
53ARSIWA (n 46) 113–4, art 41(2); DARIO (n 46) 66–8, art 42(2).
54Opinion of AG Wathelet, Polisario case (n 17) para 259.
55See the contribution of Cedric Ryngaert and Rutger Fransen in the present issue.
56Case 181/73 R. & V. Haegeman v Belgian State [1974] ECR 1974 00449, para 5.
57Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part
[2014] OJ L 161/3 (Association Agreement EU-Ukraine), art 2.
58Velluti (n 4) 55.
59Association Agreement EU-Ukraine (n 57) art 478(1).
60Letter annexed to Council Decision of 25 March 2002 concluding consultations with Liberia under Articles 96 and 97 of
the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement [2002] OJ L96/23, cited in The European Parliament’s role in relation to human rights in
trade and investment agreements (study, written by Lorand Bartels) EXPO/B/DROI/2012-09 (February 2014) (The European
Parliament’s role in relation to human rights) para 20.
61Muhamad Mugraby v Council of the European Union [2011] (n 26) paras 59, 60 and below, subsection 3.1.
62See the instances, until 2015, in Answer given by Vice-President Mogherini on behalf of the Commission, 5 August 2015,
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2015-008626&language=EN> accessed 5 July 2018.
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authors accept that human rights clauses are legally binding,63 and not only on the third State, but also on
the EU.64
The essential element clauses are considered as applying to the internal and external policies of the
Parties.65 This is clear from the wording of human rights clauses, on the one hand, and from the human
rights impact assessment policy of the European Commission, on the other hand. Regarding the wording
of the human rights clauses, they generally provide that the respect for the democratic principles and
fundamental human rights ‘shall form the basis of’ (or ‘inspire’) ‘the domestic and external policies of
the Parties and constitute essential elements of this Agreement’.66 The Commission conducts its human
rights impact assessment with a global view of the EU’s policies: it held that when considering the impact
of trade policies on human rights issues, the EU’s ‘[i]nternational trade policy should be seen as one
component in a jigsaw of policies’ including domestic policies in areas having an impact on the overall
relations with the country/ies concerned.67 This is because trade agreements themselves are often unlikely
to produce serious impacts on human rights on their own, but it is rather domestic policies that create such
impacts.68 Consequently, essential element clauses apply both to external policies and the extraterritorial
effects of domestic policies of the EU.69
2.2.3. Multilateral human rights conventions
Multilateral human rights conventions are normally open for signature by States, while it is rare that
they allow the signature by IOs. As of June 2018, the EU has ratified only one multilateral human rights
convention and recently signed another one.
The EU is formally party to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD),
which is open for signature not only by States but also by regional integration organisations. It signed
the Convention in 2007 and ratified it on the 23 December 2010.70 The CRPD itself requires the EU to
adopt measures with extraterritorial effects: it provides for the obligation of international cooperation.
The inclusion of this obligation in the CRPD was inspired by the general duty of international cooperation
in Article 2(1) ICESCR and some rights in other core human rights treaties such as Article 28 Convention
on the Rights of the Child (on education) or Article 11 ICESCR (on the right to an adequate standard of
living).71 The major model provision, Article 2(1) ICESCR, is a clear obligation of means, as opposed to
obligations of result, which require the achievement of a certain outcome, because it provides only on
the way in which States parties shall act. Under the provision, each State party undertakes ‘to take steps,
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the
63Bartels (n 2) 1079; Narine Ghazaryan, ‘A New Generation of Human Rights Clauses? The Case of Association Agreements
in the Eastern Neighbourhood’ (2015) 40 European Law Review 391, 406; Francesca Martines, ‘Human Rights Clauses in EU
Agreements’ in Sara Poli (ed), Protecting Human Rights in the European Union’s External Relations (TMC Asser Instituut
2016) 49–50 <http://www.asser.nl/media/3344/cleer016-05_web.pdf> accessed 7 May 2018; a contrario Vincent Depaigne,
‘Protecting Fundamental Rights in Trade Agreements between the EU and Third Countries’ [2017] European Law Review 562,
564–5. (‘“political” clauses rather than strictly legal provisions’).
64European Ombudsman, Decision on complaint 933/2004/JMA (28 June 2005) para 1.4.
65Bartels (n 2) 1079; The European Parliament’s role in relation to human rights (n 60) para 20; Decision on complaint
933/2004/JMA (n 64) para 1.3.
66Association Agreement EU-Ukraine (n 57) art 2; Euro-Mediterranean agreement establishing an association between the
European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part [2000] OJ L
70/2, art 2; Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part,
and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 [2000] OJ L 317/3,
art 9(2).
67European Commission, Guidelines on the analysis of human rights impacts in impact assessments for trade-related policy
initiatives, 2015, 4 <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/july/tradoc_153591.pdf> accessed 3 November 2017.
68Berne Declaration, Canadian Council for International Co-operation & Misereor (2010), Human Rights Impact Assessment
for Trade and Investment Agreements, 6 <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/food/docs/report_hria-seminar_2010.pdf>
accessed 5 December 2017.
69Bartels (n 2) 1080.
70Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (adopted 13 December 2006) 2515 UNTS 3 (CRPD), art 42.
71Marianne Schulze, Understanding the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: A Handbook on the Human
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (3rd edn, Handicap International 2010) 173.
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rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means’.72 Among the general obligations, the
CRPD reiterates the same duty of international cooperation with regard to economic, social and cultural
rights of persons with disabilities.73 Furthermore, Article 32(1) provides more generally:
States Parties recognize the importance of international cooperation and its promotion, in support
of national efforts for the realization of the purpose and objectives of the present Convention, and
will undertake appropriate and effective measures in this regard, between and among States and, as
appropriate, in partnership with relevant international and regional organizations and civil society, in
particular organizations of persons with disabilities.74
It is clear that the provision expects a positive obligation from States parties, namely to support,
through international cooperation, ‘the realization of the purpose and objectives’ of the CRPD. The same
article enumerates some measures as examples implementing international cooperation, such as making
development programmes inclusive of and accessible to persons with disabilities, facilitating and
supporting capacity-building, facilitating cooperation in research and access to scientific and technical
knowledge or ‘[p]roviding, as appropriate, technical and economic assistance’.75 From the first concluding
observations formulated by the control body, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(Committee RPD), it is clear that Article 32 is addressed not only to subsidised States benefiting from
development aids76 but also to donor countries offering various international cooperation programmes
to other countries. The Committee RPD held that the obligation has a clear extraterritorial effect in
the sense that the States parties shall formulate their programmes of international cooperation, such as
development aid, in a certain manner so that the rights of persons with disabilities in third countries could
be promoted.77
As a Party to the CRPD, the EU reiterated several times its commitment to ‘promote the rights
of people with disabilities in their external action, including EU enlargement, neighbourhood and
development programmes’.78 Indeed, the Committee RPD welcomes as positive aspects the trend
‘to include the rights of persons with disabilities in the financing of its external actions’ and ‘the inclusion
of disability in priority areas of the European Union communication on the post-2015 Sustainable
Development Goals’.79 However, the Committee noted with concern ‘the lack of a systematic and
institutionalized approach to mainstream the rights of persons with disabilities’ in the EU international
cooperation policies, ‘the lack of coordination and coherence among European Union institutions’,
‘the lack of disability focal points’ and the fact that EU ‘international development funding is used to
create or renovate institutional settings for the placement of persons with disabilities, segregated special
education schools and sheltered workshops, contrary to the principles and provisions of the Convention’.80
This confirms that the treaty monitoring body, arguably the international body enabled to provide the most
authoritative interpretation of the CRPD, is of the view that Article 32 requires the EU to protect and
promote the rights of persons with disabilities in third countries through its policies and programmes.
As the Committee’s recommendations clarified, the EU development programmes, in particular, are
appropriate policies to implement the duty of international cooperation. It recommended the EU among
others to ‘adopt a harmonized policy on disability-inclusive development and establish a systematic
approach to mainstream the rights of persons with disabilities’ in all of its international cooperation
72International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR),
art 2(1).
73CRPD (n 70) art 4(2).
74ibid, art 32(1).
75ibid.
76In this sense: Schulze (n 71) 174.
77Eg Committee RPD ‘Concluding observations: New Zealand’ (31 October 2014) UN Doc. CRPD/C/NZL/CO/1, paras 71–2;
Committee RPD ‘Concluding observations: Germany’ (13 May 2015) UN Doc. CRPD/C/DEU/CO/1, paras 59–60.
78European Disability Strategy 2010–2020: A Renewed Commitment to a Barrier-Free Europe, Brussels, 15.11.2010,
COM(2010) 636 final, 9; Committee RPD ‘Initial report of the EU’ (3 December 2014) UN Doc. CRPD/C/EU/1, paras 208, 213;
‘Replies of the European Union to the list of issues’ (8 July 2015) UN Doc. CRPD/C/EU/Q/1/Add.1, para 14.
79CRPD ‘Concluding observations: European Union’ (2 October 2015) UN Doc. CRPD/C/EU/CO/1, para 4.
80ibid, para 74.
Europe and the World: A law review 2-1 10
policies and programmes and to ‘identify and put in place mechanisms to disaggregate data on disability
in order to monitor the rights of persons with disabilities in European Union development programmes’.81
It also recommended that the EU ‘interrupt any international development funding that is being used to
perpetuate the segregation of persons with disabilities, and re-allocate such funding towards projects and
initiatives that aim at compliance with the Convention’.82
Beyond the CRPD, the EU has committed itself to respect and accede to the ECHR,83 although the
technical implementation of the accession to the convention has been and will be problematic. In its
opinion 2/13 of 2014, the CJEU held that the agreement on the accession of the EU to the ECHR is not
compatible with Article 6(2) TEU or with Protocol (No 8).84 The opinion has been much criticised by
commentators as an attempt of the Court of Justice to safeguard the distinctiveness of the EU’s autonomy
while risking undermining the agenda to adhere to the ECHR.85 The Court of Justice based its conclusion
mainly on the assumption that the proposed accession agreement ‘is liable adversely to affect the specific
characteristics and the autonomy of EU law’ in a number of its provisions. Among other issues, the Court
held problematic that the envisaged agreement failed to respect the specific characteristics of judicial
review in the area of CFSP: while certain acts adopted in the context of the CFSP fall outside the ambit
of judicial review by the CJEU, under the accession agreement the ECtHR would be empowered to rule
on the compatibility with the ECHR of those acts escaping the jurisdiction of the CJEU.86 If accession
happens, the ECHR would undoubtedly bind the EU in relation to its external policies and domestic
policies that have an extraterritorial effect.87
Less problematic is the recent signature by the EU of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing
and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention) on 13 June 2017,88
the text of which expressly enables the EU to sign the convention.89 Similar to the CRPD, the Istanbul
Convention provides direction on international cooperation and imposes obligations on the States parties
in an entire chapter concerning international cooperation, consisting of four articles (on general principles,
measures relating to persons at risk, information and data protection). From the point of view of trade and
investment policies, it is remarkable that its Article 62(4) provides:
Parties shall endeavour to integrate, where appropriate, the prevention and the fight against violence
against women and domestic violence in assistance programmes for development provided for the
benefit of third States, including by entering into bilateral and multilateral agreements with third States
with a view to facilitating the protection of victims in accordance with Article 18, paragraph 5.90
The aim of the integration of ‘the prevention and the fight against violence against women and
domestic violence in assistance programmes for development’ is under Article 18(5) of the Istanbul




84Opinion 2/13 (Full Court) [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454.
85Adam Lazowski and Ramses A Wessel, ‘When Caveats Turn into Locks: Opinion 2/13 on Accession of the European Union
to the ECHR Special Section – Opinion 2/13: The E.U. and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2015) 16 German
Law Journal 179; Jed Odermatt, ‘The EU’s Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights: An International Law
Perspective’ (2014) 47 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 59; Louise Halleskov Storgaard, ‘EU
Law Autonomy versus European Fundamental Rights Protection – On Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR’ (2015) 15
Human Rights Law Review 485.
86ibid, paras 251–7.
87The ECtHR prohibits transferring a person to a country where he or she will face a risk of a violation of arts 3 (torture,
inhuman and degrading treatment) and 2 (right to life) of the ECHR. See eg Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439;
recently the list of foreseeable violations was extended to art 6 ECHR (right to a fair trial). See Othman (Abu Qatada) v United
Kingdom (2012) 55 EHRR 1. The ECtHR also added to the list the risk of violation of ECHR, art 13 (right to effective remedies),
see M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece (2011) 53 EHRR 2, paras 286 etc, especially para 293.
88Council of Europe, The European Union signs the Istanbul Convention, <http://www.coe.int/en/web/genderequality/-/
european-union-signs-the-istanbul-convention> accessed 19 June 2017.
89Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (adopted
11 May 2011) CETS No. 210 [Istanbul Convention], art 75(1).
90ibid, art 62(4).
The extraterritorial human rights obligations of the EU in its external trade and investment policies 11
violence. This means that in their development assistance programmes benefiting third States, States
parties shall ‘take account of and duly incorporate issues relating mainly to the prevention of these forms
of crimes [of violence against women and domestic violence], including with a view to facilitating the
protection of victims’.91 The EU committed itself to give the Istanbul Convention ‘a more effective role
in international fora’, ‘through internal and external EU policies’.92 As in relation to the CRPD, it is
submitted that once the EU ratifies the Istanbul Convention, it is bound to promote the prevention and the
fight against violence against women and domestic violence in third countries through its internal policies
and external action, including EU enlargement as well as neighbourhood and development programmes.
In sum, the CRPD obliges the EU to shape in a certain way the extraterritorial effects of its
international cooperation policies and programmes, especially its development policy, EU enlargement
or neighbourhood policies, so that they support, through international cooperation, ‘the realization of
the purpose and objectives’ of the CRPD in third States. Beyond this, the aforementioned customary
international law norms and the human rights clauses in trade agreements also oblige the EU to respect
human rights in its domestic policies that have extraterritorial effects on persons in third States, but it is
less clear whether they also require positive measures to protect and promote the human rights of those
individuals, as in the case of the CRPD.
2.2.4. Due diligence standard with respect to trade and investment policies
‘Due diligence’ or ‘vigilance’ is a substantial law obligation that requires that the State take all reasonable
efforts within its power to prevent and repress the commission of internationally wrongful acts law by
others, that is non-state private actors or other States.93 Considered by the ICJ as a customary norm94 or
general principle of law,95 due diligence is understood in the doctrine as a ‘standard’,96 that is a norm that
prescribes the limits of legal conduct while allowing ‘a certain margin of attainment within the bounds
of reason’, as opposed to a ‘rule’, defined as ‘capable of strictly logical application’.97 Under the due
diligence standard in international human rights law, States are obliged to protect human rights against
violations by third parties such as corporations. As the Inter-American Court of Human Rights recognised
in the often-cited Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras case:
An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly imputable to a State
(for example, because it is the act of a private person or because the person responsible has not
been identified) can lead to international responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself,
but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by
the Convention.98
Other universal and regional human rights bodies followed this standard when they confirmed that
States have due diligence obligations to protect individuals from the infringement of their human rights
by corporations.99 In trade and investment policies, human rights monitoring bodies and the CJEU have
guided three main developments with respect to: (2.2.4.a) the application of the due diligence standard to
91Explanatory Report to the Istanbul Convention [2011], para 332.
92Proposal for a Council decision on the signing, on behalf of the EU, of the Istanbul Convention [2016], COM (2016) 111
final, 2016/0063 (NLE), 7.
93Timo Koivurova, ‘Due Diligence’, MPEPIL (2010) para 2.
94Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) [2010] ICJ Rep 55–6, para 101.
95Corfu Channel case (n 42) 22; Koivurova (n 93) para 2.
96Corfu Channel case (n 42) 22; Koivurova (n 93) para 2.1. The ILC usually applies this term, see ILC ‘International
responsibility. Second report by F. v Garcia Amador’ (15 February 1957) UN Doc A/CN.4/106, 122, para 3; ILC ‘The law of the
non-navigational uses of international watercourses’ (15 February 1957) UN Doc A/49/10, 103, para 5.
97This is the terminology used in: Roscoe Pound, ‘Standards in International Law’ (1921) 34 Harvard Law Review 776, 776.
98Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras (Merits) IACtHR Series C No. 4 (29 July 1988) para 172.
99Bevacqua and S. v Bulgaria App no 71127/01 (ECtHR, 12 June 2008) para 53; Opuz v Turkey (2010) 50 EHRR 28, paras
83–4; in the same sense, without referring to the Velásquez case: Case of Gonzales Lluy et al. v Ecuador (Preliminary objections,
merits, reparations and costs) IACtHR Series C No. 298 (1 September 2015) para 90; Guerra and Others v Italy (1998) 26
EHRR 357, para 58; Osman v The United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 245, para 115; Noah Kazingachire, John Chitsenga, Elias
Chemvura and Batanai Hadzisi (represented by Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum) v Zimbabwe African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights Communication 295/04 (18 April–2 May 2012) para 133 (ACommHPR); The Social and Economic
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the external action of States, (2.2.4.b) the extension of those obligations to IOs in general and (2.2.4.c) to
the EU, in particular.
2.2.4.a. The application of the due diligence standard to the external action of States
Increasingly, UN treaty monitoring bodies interpret treaties in a way that requires States parties to exert
due diligence in their trade and investment policies. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (CESCR) is a pioneer in interpreting the States parties’ extraterritorial obligations, on the basis
of the territorially unlimited scope of the Covenant and its Article 2(1) on international cooperation.
The CESCR interpreted the Covenant as requiring States parties to ‘ensure that the right to health is
given due attention in international agreements and, to that end, should consider the development of
further legal instruments’, and that the States parties ‘should take steps to ensure that these instruments
do not adversely impact upon the right to health’.100 In its General Comments relating to the right to
water,101 the right to social security,102 the right to just and favourable conditions of work,103 as well as
in its examination of States’ periodic reports, the CESCR has reiterated these positive obligations with
regard to extraterritorial effects of the States parties’ policies. In this light, the creation of substantial and
foreseeable effects outside the State’s territory establishes the jurisdiction of the State party.
Especially with regard to investment policy, treaty monitoring bodies recommend that States parties
exercise due diligence over corporate nationals abroad by all means at their disposal whenever they
know or should have known about the risk of a human rights violation. The Human Rights Committee
recommended to certain States parties that all business enterprises domiciled in their territory and/or their
jurisdiction respect human rights standards in accordance with the Covenant throughout their operations
and that they establish investigation and legal redress mechanisms regarding the harmful activities of such
business enterprises operating abroad.104
In its general comments, the CESCR often reiterated that States parties shall protect some economic,
social and cultural rights by preventing their own citizens and national entities from violating those
rights in other countries, even by expressly requiring the home State to establish its extraterritorial
jurisdiction.105 The CESCR generally requires the capacity to influence the conduct of the corporate
national, recommending that ‘[w]here States parties can take steps to influence third parties (non-State
actors) within their jurisdiction to respect the right, through legal or political means, such steps should be
taken in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and applicable international law.’106 In its
recent General Comment on State obligations in the Context of Business Activities, it reiterated that ‘States
Parties are required to take the necessary steps to prevent human rights violations abroad by corporations
domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction’.107 Based on this requirement, the Maastricht Principles,
a set of guidelines elaborated by human rights experts aiming to clarify the content of extraterritorial
State obligations to realise economic, social and cultural rights, also recognised the home State’s duty to
regulate the extraterritorial operations of its corporate nationals.108
Other UN treaty bodies similarly recognised the home States’ duty to respect, protect and fulfil
Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights/Nigeria, ACommHPR Communication No. 155/96 (October
2001) para 57.
100Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) ‘General Comment No. 14 (2000)’ (11 August 2000) UN
Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, para 39 (CESCR, General Comment No. 14).
101CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 15 (2002)’ (20 January 2003) UN Doc. E/C.12/2002/11, paras 31, 33.
102CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 19’ (4 February 2008) UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/19, para 54.
103CESCR, ‘General comment No. 23 (2016)’ (27 April 2016) UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/23, para 70.
104UN Human Rights Committee ‘Concluding observations: Germany’ (12 November 2012) UN Doc CCPR/C/DEU/CO/6,
para 16; UN Human Rights Committee ‘Concluding observations: Canada’ (13 August 2015) UN Doc CCPR/C/CAN/CO/6,
para 6.
105CESCR ‘General Comment No. 19’ (n 102) para 54.
106ibid; CESCR ‘General Comment No. 14’ (n 100) para 39; CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 15 (2002)’ (n 101) para 33;
CESCR ‘Statement on the obligations of States Parties regarding the corporate sector and economic, social and cultural rights’
(20 May 2011) UN Doc. E/C.12/2011/1, para 5.
107CESCR ‘General Comment No. 24’ (23 June 2017) UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/24, para 26.
108Maastricht Principles (n 43) art 24.
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human rights in the context of their corporate nationals’ extraterritorial activities and operations.109
The numerous recommendations suggest that States parties are required to prevent the violation of human
rights in third countries through regular human rights impact assessments and the States’ influence on
third parties such as their trade partners or their corporate nationals. They are encouraged to appropriately
regulate the investments and activities of their corporate nationals abroad110 and to adapt their legislative
framework (civil, criminal and administrative) to ensure the legal accountability of companies and their
subsidiaries operating in or managed from the State party’s territory in relation to abuses of human
rights.111 Beyond the mere negative duty to respect, risk assessment and prevention that due diligence
requires imply positive obligations to protect.
2.2.4.b. The extension of the due diligence standard to international organisations
From the early 2000s, international human rights monitoring bodies, especially UN Charter-based
mechanisms, have started to address recommendations to both States and IOs. While admitting that States
are clearly the primary addressees of human rights obligations, human rights monitoring bodies began
to consider ‘the ways in which States acting collectively through international organizations, including
those most closely related to globalization, also hold responsibilities to respect human rights in their
fields of activity’.112 With respect to business and human rights, IOs were called on to take concrete
steps to implement and facilitate human rights due diligence by small and medium-sized enterprises,113 to
promote the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on business and human rights114 and to ensure
that focus on economic growth does not ignore human rights.115
Treaty monitoring bodies, empowered to give authoritative interpretation of the respective human
rights treaty while reviewing its enforcement, initially emphasised the obligation of States parties to
ensure that their actions as members of IOs take due account of the human rights enshrined in the
relevant treaty.116 The Committee on the Rights of the Child expressly recommended, with regard to a
Member State in the EU, that the State party engages ‘its responsibility within the European Union to
ensure that cotton originated from child labour (produced in Europe or elsewhere) does not enter into
the European market, using its leverage to ensure that children’s rights are respected within European
trade agreements’.117
Beyond the compliance by the States parties with their treaty obligations as members in IOs, the
CESCR recommended that IOs ‘should cooperate more effectively, building on their respective expertise,
on the implementation of the right to food at the national level’ and that international financial institutions
‘should pay greater attention to the protection of the right to food’ in their conduct.118 The Committee
on the Rights of the Child recently went beyond the membership of the States parties and emphasised
that ‘[i]nternational organizations should have standards and procedures to assess the risk of harm to
109Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) ‘General comment No. 16 (2013)’ (17 April 2013) UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/16,
para 43 (CRC, General comment No. 16); CEDAW ‘General recommendation No. 28’ (16 December 2010) UN Doc
CEDAW/C/GC/28, para 36 (CEDAW, ‘General recommendation No. 28’).
110CRC ‘Concluding observations: Sweden’ (23 January 2012) UN Doc CRC/C/OPSC/SWE/CO/1, para 21.
111CRC ‘Concluding observations: Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (29 November 2012) UN Doc CRC/C/BIH/CO/2-4, para 28(a).
112Analytical study of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the fundamental principle of participation and its
application in the context of globalisation (23 December 2004) UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/41, paras 43, 52.
113Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises
(24 April 2017) UN Doc. A/HRC/35/32, para 77.
114‘Guiding Principles on business and human rights’ (21 March 2011) UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31; ‘Report of the Working
Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises’ (14 March 2013) UN Doc.
A/HRC/23/32, para 74; ‘Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other
business enterprises’ (10 August 2012) UN Doc. A/67/285, para 78.
115‘Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises on
the Asia Forum on Business and Human Rights’ (30 May 2016) UN Doc. A/HRC/32/45/Add.2, para 89.
116CESCR ‘General Comment 12’ (12 May 1999) UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/5, para 38 (CESCR, General Comment 12); CESCR
‘General Comment No. 14 (2000)’ (n 100) para 39; CRC ‘General comment No. 16 (2013)’ (n 109), paras 47–8; CEDAW
‘General recommendation No. 30’ (1 November 2013) UN Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/30, paras 9, 12(a).
117CRC ‘Concluding observations: Italy’ (31 October 2011) UN Doc. CRC/C/ITA/CO/3-4, para 21.
118CESCR ‘General Comment 12’ (n 116) paras 40–1.
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children in conjunction with new projects and to take measures to mitigate risks of such harm’.119
The wording ‘should’ instead of ‘shall’ implies that treaty bodies could only address those conclusions in
a recommendatory sense, contributing to the progressive development of the treaty interpretation rather
than creating new obligations.
It is noteworthy that States, in accordance with these recommendations, also accept that IOs have
such obligations. Recently, the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution on the right to food that
invited IOs
to promote such policies and projects that have a positive impact on the right to food, to ensure that
partners respect the right to food in the implementation of common projects, to support strategies of
Member States aimed at the fulfilment of the right to food and to avoid any actions that could have a
negative impact on the realization of the right to food.120
This clarifies that IOs, just like States, are expected to assess the risks of human rights violations by
their trade and investment partners in and outside their Member States and take all reasonable efforts to
avoid such foreseeable human rights violations. These positive obligations bind the EU121 on the basis of
its pre-existing internal and external sources of human rights duties.
2.2.4.c. The extension of the due diligence standard to the EU
Various EU instruments recognise that before concluding any trade or investment agreement, the risk
of possible human rights violations should be assessed. The Council and the Commission committed
themselves to ‘insert human rights in Impact Assessment, as and when it is carried out for legislative
and non-legislative proposals . . . and trade agreements that have significant economic, social and
environmental impacts’.122 As mentioned above (2.1), the General Court held in the Polisario case
that before any export facilitation agreement is finalised, a human rights impact assessment must be
carried out;123 on appeal, the Advocate General seemed to accept this obligation, and in final judgment
the Court of Justice did not specifically address this point.124
Some commentators welcomed the General Court’s conclusion on prior human rights assessment in
external trade policy.125 Nevertheless, it was criticised by others on several grounds: (1) the General Court
departed from established case law; (2) the autonomy of the Union’s legal order would be compromised
by making the legality of Union acts dependent on acts of third States;126 (3) the unlimited formulation;
and (4) the unconvincing legal basis of the EU’s obligation. As this part explains, none of these criticisms
convincingly weakens the extension of the due diligence standard to the EU.
As regards the first objection, the Court established the Council’s alleged obligation to examine
‘carefully and impartially all the relevant facts of the individual case’ in the Technische Universität
München and Gowan cases,127 but not in an external relations context.128 Those cases concerned
individual/administrative decisions or administrative procedures entailing complex technical evaluations
119CRC ‘General comment No. 16’ (n 116) para 48.
120Human Rights Council ‘Resolution No. 28/10’ (2 April 2015) UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/28/10, para 38.
121In the same sense: Ganesh (n 2) 530.
122Council conclusions of 25 June 2012 on Human Rights and Democracy, the EU Strategic Framework on Human TFEU Rights
and Democracy and an EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, 11855/12, Annex III, I.1, 11; Joint Communication
from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 28 April 2015 JOIN(2015) 16 final, 24.
123Front Polisario v Council, General Court judgment (n 5) para 228.
124Polisario case, judgment of the Court of Justice (n 6).
125Susan Power, ‘EU Exploitation of Fisheries in Occupied Western Sahara: Examining the Case of the Front Polisario v
Council of the European Union in Light of the Failure to Account for Belligerent Occupation’ (2016) 19 Irish Journal of
European Law 27, 37; Eyal Benvenisti, ‘The E.U. Must Consider Threats to Fundamental Rights of Non-E.U. Nationals by
Its Potential Trading Partners’ (GlobalTrust, 13 December 2015) <http://globaltrust.tau.ac.il/the-e-u-must-consider-threats-to-
fundamental-rights-of-non-eu-nationals-by-its-potential-trading-partners/> accessed 23 December 2017; Hummelbrunner and
Prickartz (n 33) 32–3.
126De Elera (n 33) 282–5.
127C-269/90 Technische Universität München [1991] ECR 1991 I-05469, para 14; C-77/09 Gowan comércio Internacional e
Servios [2010] 2010 I-13533, para 57.
128De Elera (n 33) 282–3.
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by EU institutions. In the context of external relations, the Odigitria case laid down the applicable test.
In the latter case, the Court held that in the field of the Community’s external economic relations, ‘review
by the Community Court must be limited to examining whether the measure in question is vitiated by
a manifest error or misuse of powers, or whether the authority in question has manifestly exceeded the
limits of its discretion’.129 Nonetheless, the two tests can be reconciled: it is possible to assess a high
number of complex factors in the external relations domain to the extent that the EU has the knowledge of
foreseeable human rights violations and the means to prevent them.
With respect to the second objection, the prior human rights assessment would not compromise the
autonomy of the EU’s legal order because it would focus only on foreseeable risks, that is, it would be an
objective evaluation within the power of the EU.
The third objection is against the unlimited formulation of the EU’s obligation. While the General
Court implied that the foreseeable risk of any violation of fundamental rights should exclude the conclusion
of an agreement by the EU, the Court of Justice did not rule on this question. Advocate-General Wathelet,
however, suggested a more restricted view – namely, to limit the EU’s obligation only to ensure compliance
with jus cogens and erga omnes obligations rather than with the full range of fundamental rights.130
This view reflects the customary international law duty to refrain from rendering aid or assistance in
maintaining situations created by jus cogens violations, and the duty to cooperate internationally to bring
to an end human rights violations of peremptory norms such as slavery, torture or trafficking of human
beings in the case law of the ECtHR.131
The fourth criticism concerns the unconvincing legal basis of the judgment. While the General
Court based the EU’s obligation of risk assessment on Article 73 UN Charter, the UN Charter imposes
obligations on States administering a non-self-governing territory and not on third States or IOs.132 Yet,
while the General Court’s judgment failed to explain the source and the limits of the obligation of care/due
diligence, customary international law and the human rights treaty obligations of the EU to protect the
physical integrity of individuals should be the correct legal basis.133
To summarise this section, the EU has an obligation under its own ‘constitutional law’, customary
international law and its human rights treaty obligations to assess and prevent foreseeable human rights
violations in third countries as a consequence of its domestic policies. Therefore the EU has to integrate
risk assessment in its trade and investment policies; furthermore, whenever it has knowledge of foreseeable
human rights violations and the means to prevent them, it has to act proactively. The core of the due
diligence standard is the EU’s obligation to ensure compliance with jus cogens and erga omnes obligations,
especially to protect the physical integrity of individuals in third States against the harmful effects of its
trade and investment policies.
3. The enforcement of the duty to protect extraterritorially
The enforcement of EU law and the enforcement of the EU’s international law obligations are regulated
by different rules regarding enforcement and liability. While the institutions of the EU supervise the
respect of the EU ‘constitutional law’, especially the CJEU (3.1), treaty monitoring bodies enforce the
EU’s international law obligations (3.2).
3.1. The enforcement of the EU’s ‘constitutional law’ obligations
As some scholars argue, individuals affected by extraterritorial effects of EU policies in third countries
cannot challenge the measures affecting their human rights and thus enforce the human rights obligations
129Case T-572/93 Odigitria AAE v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities ECR 1995
II-02025, paras 36, 38.
130Opinion of AG Wathelet, Polisario case (n 17) paras 257–8, 276.
131See n 50.
132Simon and Rigaux (n 33) paras 29–30.
133In the same sense, Vivian Kube, ‘The Polisario Case: Do EU Fundamental Rights Matter for EU Trade Policies?’ (EJIL:
Talk!, 2 March 2017) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-polisario-case-do-eu-fundamental-rights-matter-for-eu-trade-polices/>
accessed 13 November 2017.
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of the EU.134 The reason is the narrow definition of the standing rules of individual applicants before
the CJEU under Article 263(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). In
the Commune de Champagne case, Swiss producers of wine brought action against the Council and
the Commission, requesting the CJEU to annul the Agreement between the Community and the Swiss
Confederation on Trade in Agricultural Products. Under Article 263(1) TFEU, the CJEU can only review
the legality of EU acts ‘intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties’. Nonetheless, the Court
of Justice held that the rule applies only to acts within the territory of the EU for two reasons. First, the
Court points out ‘that the principle of sovereign equality enshrined in Article 2(1) of the United Nations
Charter means that it is, as a rule, a matter for each State to legislate in its own territory and, accordingly,
that generally a State may unilaterally impose binding rules only in its own territory’.135 Second, it held
‘that an act of an institution adopted pursuant to the Treaty, as a unilateral act of the Community, cannot
create rights and obligations outside the territory thus defined’ and therefore ‘the scope of the contested
decision is limited to that territory and it has no legal effect in the territory of Switzerland’.136 This results
in the exclusion of individuals in third countries from having the standing to challenge an EU unilateral
act before the CJEU on the basis of violations of their human rights extraterritorially.
The reasoning is contestable because the principle of sovereign equality does not ipso jure exclude
States from exercising their jurisdiction in third States.137 In fact, the EU does exercise in various policies
its prescriptive jurisdiction over individuals outside the territory of the Member States.138 The Advocate
General139 and Court of Justice140 later recognised in other judgments that Member States may exercise
their prescriptive jurisdiction with respect to situations in third countries.
However, the recent Polisario case does not change the Commune de Champagne case law.141
Moreover, the Polisario case did not address the issue of standing of individuals, given the fact that the
General Court only accepted the direct and individual concern of Front Polisario as the representative of
the people of Western Sahara. Another criterion of the ‘direct and individual concern’ is that the contested
act affect the given natural or legal persons ‘by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or
by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons, and by virtue of these
factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the person addressed’.142 The General Court
held that this condition was fulfilled in the Polisario case because ‘[t]he Front Polisario is the only other
participant in the UN-led negotiations between it and the Kingdom of Morocco with a view to determining
the definitive international status of Western Sahara.’143 On appeal, the standing of the Front Polisario
was neither addressed in the merits nor contested by the judgment of the Court of Justice.144
Likewise, individuals cannot enforce human rights clauses of bilateral agreements: the CJEU held
in the Mugraby case that (1) the suspension of the agreement on account of the human rights clause is
discretionary; each party to the agreement is free to decide whether there may be an infringement of
the clause; (2) the discretionary power left for the parties means that the human rights clause could be
attributed direct effect; and (3) individual applicants cannot establish how they could acquire a right from
134Bartels (n 2) 1088; Ganesh (n 2) 487.
135Case T-212/02 Commune de Champagne v Council and Commission [2007] ECR 2007 II-02017, para 89.
136ibid, para 90.
137Bartels (n 2) 1088.
138See eg Regulation (EC) No. 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Community Code
on Visas [2009] OJ L 243/1, art 39 (conduct of consular staff); Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on a European Union
military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali
coast [2008] OJ L 301/33, Article 11 (Status of EU-led forces). This jurisdiction of the EU over persons accused of piracy was
approved in Case C-263/14 European Parliament v Council [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:435, paras 52–3; Moreno-Lax and Costello
(n 2) 1670–6.
139Case C-507/13 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European
Union [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2394, Opinion of AG Jääskinen, para 32. The case was withdrawn by the applicant governments
and not examined by the Court.
140Case C-525/14 European Commission v Czech Republic [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:714, para 54.
141In the same sense, Ganesh (n 2) 488.
142Front Polisario v Council, General Court judgment (n 5) para 112 and the references cited there.
143ibid, para 113 and the references cited there.
144Polisario case, judgment of the Court of Justice (n 6) paras 130–1.
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those expectations.145 It is no wonder that an author considered human rights clauses of bilateral trade
agreements as ‘soft political conditions’.146
Notwithstanding the non-enforceability of extraterritorial human rights obligations by the affected
individuals in third States, some non-judicial mechanisms might incite EU institutions to change their
conduct or bring an action before the CJEU. As is well known, EU institutions and EU Member States are
privileged applicants before the CJEU in the sense that they can challenge an EU act or omission even
in the absence of direct effect, without the need to prove the fulfilment of the criteria direct effect and
individual concern.147
The first possible intervener in any allegation of human rights violations caused by the extraterritorial
effects of EU policies is the European Ombudsman. Only citizens of the Union or any natural or
legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State can file complaints with the
European Ombudsman concerning instances of maladministration, that is, the breach of the right to good
administration under Article 41 EUCFR, in the activities of the Union institutions, bodies, offices or
agencies.148 Nevertheless, the right to good administration is not restricted to EU citizens, but ‘[e]very
person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by
the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union.’149 Moreover, nothing prevents the Ombudsman
opening an inquiry on their own initiative150 or requires that legal persons be founded in a Member State
with the sole purpose to represent individuals outside the EU. The outcome of the mechanism, if an
instance of maladministration is found, is the non-binding reference of the matter to the institution, body,
office or agency concerned, which shall have a period of three months in which to inform the Ombudsman
of its views.151 Although EU bodies are not obliged to follow the recommendations of the European
Ombudsman, they usually comply with the conclusions of any inquiry.
The European Ombudsman might enquire into human rights violations as a consequence of
extraterritorial effects under the broader notion of ‘maladministration’. The European Ombudsman
found, in her decision of 26 February 2016 on the European Commission’s failure to carry out a prior
human rights impact assessment of the free trade agreement between the EU and Vietnam, that the
Commission’s failure to provide valid reasons to justify its refusal to carry out such an assessment
constituted maladministration.152 The Ombudsman derived the duty to carry out a human rights impact
assessment before the conclusion of a trade agreement from Articles 21(1) and 21(2) TEU.153 In the
Polisario case, the Advocate General cited this decision of the European Ombudsman, suggesting that
there is no reason not to require that EU institutions, ‘before the conclusion of an international agreement,
. . . examine the human rights situation in the other party to the agreement and the impact which the
conclusion of the agreement at issue could have there in this regard’.154 The European Ombudsman recently
confirmed the obligation of prior human rights impact assessment in her inquiry about the EU-Turkey
Agreement, where she considered this duty ‘fundamental, since the implementation of the Agreement
reasonably and necessarily has an impact (a) on the human rights of migrants (direct or indirect) and (b) on
the ability of the EU and the Member States involved to fulfil their human rights obligations’.155
Correspondingly, in a case concerning a business contact concluded between the European External
Action Service and a small company located in Tunisia, the Ombudsman derived from the right to good
administration the obligation of the EU ‘to monitor the behaviour of its contractors and, naturally, the
obligation to verify if, and to insist that, the contractor fulfils its obligations towards subcontractors’ in
145Muhamad Mugraby v Council of the European Union [2011] (n 61) paras 59, 61, 71.
146Maubernard (n 2) 307.
147Case C-377/98 Kingdom of the Netherlands v European Parliament and Council [2001] ECR 2001 I-07079, para 54.




152European Ombudsman, Decision in case 1409/2014/MHZ (26 February 2016).
153ibid, para 11.
154Opinion of AG Wathelet, Polisario case (n 17) para 262.
155European Ombudsman, Decision in the joint inquiry into complaints 506-509-674-784-927-1381/2016/MHZ (18 January
2017) para 26.
Europe and the World: A law review 2-1 18
third States.156 Beyond the fact that the Ombudsman recognised extraterritorial due diligence obligations
in business relations, it is remarkable that she opened her inquiry upon the complaint of a Tunisian private
company. This shows that individuals from third States affected by EU policies and measures might hope
for some remedy by addressing their claim to the European Ombudsman.
Another possible intervener in the protection of human rights against extraterritorial effects of EU
policies is the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) who is charged with the protection of personal
data by the EU institutions. The EDPS is the independent supervisory authority who ‘shall be responsible
for ensuring that the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to
privacy, are respected by the Community institutions and bodies’.157 Consequently, the EDPS’s mandate is
not restricted to EU citizens, but protects the ‘personal data’ of any natural person, that is, ‘any information
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person’ (‘data subject’).158 Within their mandate, the EDPS
may ‘refer the matter to the Community institution or body concerned and, if necessary, to the European
Parliament, the Council and the Commission’, ‘refer the matter to the Court of Justice of the European
Communities under the conditions provided for in the Treaty’ and ‘intervene in actions brought before the
Court of Justice of the European Communities’.159 The EDPS’s opinions on the effects of EU policies on
personal data might persuade EU institutions to bring the matter to the CJEU, as happened in the case of
the draft agreement between Canada and the EU on the transfer and processing of passenger name record
data. After the EDPS opined that the international agreement is likely to lower the level of protection of
the fundamental right under Article 8 EUCFR,160 the European Parliament decided to ask for the opinion
of the CJEU before adopting the agreement.
In the proceedings of Opinion 1/15, the Court was required for the first time to rule on the
compatibility of a draft international agreement with the fundamental rights enshrined in the EUCFR,
namely with those relating to respect for private and family life affected by the draft agreement between
Canada and the EU on the transfer and processing of passenger name record data.161 While one can argue
that through bringing the procedure before the Court of Justice, the European Parliament intended to
protect the personal data of EU citizens and not individuals from third States, the draft agreement has a
personal scope covering all passengers flying to or from a third country, Canada and the EU.162 In his
opinion, the Advocate General required compliance by various due diligence duties, such as requiring that
the agreement establish effective remedies by Canada,163 sufficient guarantees for individuals that ‘their
data will be afforded effective protection against the risks of abuse and also against any unlawful access to
and any unlawful use of that data’,164 the control by an independent authority of the respect for the private
life and protection of the personal data of passengers,165 and so on. Several of his recommendations were
backed by the EDPS.166 In its opinion, the CJEU confirmed these concerns. It followed the due diligence
logic in so far as it required that the transfer of personal data from the EU to a non-member country shall
take place ‘only if that country ensures a level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms that is
essentially equivalent to that guaranteed within the European Union’.167 As the Court did not find this
requirement satisfied, it concluded that the agreement could not be concluded in its current form because
several of its provisions are incompatible with the fundamental rights recognised by the EU.
156European Ombudsman, Decision closing the inquiry into complaint 2410/2012/MHZ (5 January 2014) para 14.
157Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community
institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data [2000] OJ L 8/1, art 41(2).
158ibid, art 2(a).
159ibid, art 47(1)(g)–(i).
160Opinion of the EDPS on the proposals for Council decisions on the conclusion and the signature of the agreement
between Canada and the European Union on the transfer and processing of passenger name record data (30 September 2013)
<https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/13-09-30_canada_en.pdf> accessed 3 June 2017.
161Opinion 1/15 (n 8).
162ibid, Opinion of AG Mengozzi, delivered on 8 September 2016, paras 238, 242.
163ibid, para 327.
164ibid, para 208.
165ibid paras 316, 328(2).
166Request for an Opinion by the European Parliament, draft EU-Canada PNR agreement (Opinion 1/15), Pleading notes of the
EDPS, <https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/16-04-05_pleading_canada_pnr_en.pdf> accessed 3 June 2017.
167Opinion 1/15 (n 8) paras 214, 232(3)(e).
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Finally, even if individuals from third States cannot directly challenge the EU’s trade and investment
policies before the CJEU, they might ask domestic courts in Member States to initiate preliminary
reference procedures where the question of admissibility will not be an issue. Such a domestic court
procedure initiated by the Western Sahara Campaign, an independent voluntary organisation, led to the
preliminary reference procedure in which the Court of Justice concluded that the Fisheries Agreement is
not applicable to Western Sahara and to its adjacent waters.168 From the point of view of human rights,
the preliminary ruling was important as it confirmed that including Western Sahara within the scope
of the Association Agreement concluded with Morocco would be contrary to certain rules of general
international law, especially the principle of self-determination.169 One must add that, as of April 2018,
there is another pending case before the CJEU on Western Sahara: an action for annulment of a Council
decision to conclude a Fisheries Protocol with Morocco brought by Front Polisario.170
In sum, although individuals from third States do not have standing to challenge trade and investment
policies and measures of the EU before the CJEU, non-judicial mechanisms – the European Ombudsman
or the EDPS – might lead EU institutions to change their conduct or enhance their compliance with their
human rights obligations toward individuals outside the EU or to bring applications before the Court.
3.2. The enforcement of the EU’s international law obligations
The EU’s treaty obligations are enforced, as in the case of States parties to human rights treaties, by
the relevant treaty monitoring bodies. The Committee RPD bases its concluding observations on the
report prepared by the EU,171 while the Istanbul Convention’s monitoring body, once the EU ratifies the
Convention, will be able to monitor the implementation by the EU in a reporting procedure or in an urgent
inquiry procedure.172 While recommendations of those treaty monitoring bodies are non-binding, the
international publicity and authority of their conclusions might ensure compliance by the EU. As a sign of
its compliance with the CRPD, the EU took measures in conformity with three of the recommendations
of the Committee RPD on which the latter requested information within a year,173 and the EU shall
provide information on the implementation of the other recommendations in its next periodic report.
In relation to the recommendation by the Committee RPD on the EU’s international cooperation policies,
the Commission formulated some commitments to ensure that, in its external actions, EU development
cooperation reaches persons with disabilities.174 In the next reporting round, the Committee RPD
will consider whether the measures taken fully comply with the positive obligations of the EU in its
external action.
4. Conclusion
The EU is bound by human rights obligations toward individuals outside the territory of its Member States
who are affected by its trade and investment policies. On the one hand, internal rules of the EU impose
such human rights obligations, namely the Founding Treaties and the EUCFR, which all apply to the
EU’s internal and external policies. On the other hand, various external norms bind the EU, especially
customary international law, human rights clauses of bilateral treaties concluded with third States and
international human rights treaties to which the EU is or intends to be party. Based on both customary
international law and treaty obligations, the due diligence standard, in particular, binds the EU in its trade
and investment policies. UN treaty monitoring bodies increasingly interpret the States parties’ treaty
obligations in accordance with the due diligence standard, expecting extraterritorial obligations to protect.
Like States parties to human rights conventions, the EU is expected to assess the risks of human rights
168Western Sahara Campaign UK (n 7).
169ibid, para 63, confirming Polisario case, judgment of the Court of Justice (n 6) para 92.
170Case T-180/14 Front Polisario v Council, Action brought on 14 March 2014.
171CRPD, art 36.
172Istanbul Convention, arts 68(10)–(13) (reporting procedure) and 68(14)–(15) (inquiry procedure).
173CRPD ‘Concluding observations: European Union’ (n 79) para 90; CRPD ‘Information received from the European Union
on follow-up to the concluding observations’ (23 November 2017) UN Doc. CRPD/C/EU/CO/1/Add.1.
174European Commission ‘Progress Report on the implementation of the European Disability Strategy (2010–2020)’
(2 February 2017) SWD (2017) 29 final, 147.
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violations by its trade and investment partners in and outside its Member States and take all reasonable
efforts to avoid foreseeable human rights violations. At the very least, the EU has a positive law obligation
to ensure compliance with jus cogens and erga omnes obligations, especially to protect the physical
integrity of individuals in third States against the harmful effects of its trade and investment policies.
As for the enforcement of the duty to protect extraterritorially, a wide range of control bodies should
consistently monitor the EU’s compliance with its obligations. The CJEU and non-judicial control bodies
within the EU, such as the European Ombudsman or the EDPS, should ensure the enforcement of the
EU’s ‘constitutional law’ obligations to protect extraterritorially. The more they explain the source and
the scope of the obligation of due diligence, the more persuasive their impact will be on the conduct of
EU institutions. While affected individuals in third States cannot enforce the EU’s extraterritorial human
rights obligations before the CJEU, they can initiate the mechanism of the European Ombudsman or the
EDPS or ask domestic courts in Member States to initiate preliminary reference procedures before the
CJEU. The EU’s international law obligations should be, however, enforced in dialogue between the EU
and the concerned treaty monitoring bodies.
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